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INTRODUCTION
Appellant takes this opportunity to respond to the arguments
set forth in the brief of Respondent.
the Appellant are adequately covered

The remaining arguments of
in Appellant's original

Appellate Brief.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Annotated §41-6-55(3)

2.

Utah Code Annotated §41-6-73

3.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403

4.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A)

5.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 30
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS

1.

At the time of the subject accident, the weather was

sunny and clear (T. 48, lines 7-10; T. 121, lines 19-25; T. 122,
lines 1-5; T. 129, line 6; T. 143, lines 6-8, 20-21).

The road

conditions were dry and clear (T. 48, lines 11-12; T. 143, lines 68, 20-21).
2.

At trial, there was no evidence admitted to prove that

there was any glare from the sun, and whereas the parties were
headed north at the time of the accident (between 10:00 and 11:00
a.m.), no glare should be inferred (T. 42, lines 7-8, 24-25; T.
140, lines 15-17).
3.

Just prior to the accident, Defendant Warren Yarnell was

traveling north from the top of the hill to the bottom of the hill
on 1900 West just past the intersection with 1200 North; the only
1

car in front of Mr. Yarnell traveling north was the Noonan vehicle;
there was no evidence admitted to prove that there was any southbound traffic (T. 49, lines 14-25; T. 54, lines 22-25; T. 55, lines
1-3; T. 70, lines 6-15; T. 71, lines 10-25; T. 72, lines 1-3, 2325; T. 73, lines 1-2; T. 114, lines 6-9; T. 121, lines 19-22; T.
141, lines 18-20; T. 177, lines 9-10; T. 214, lines 11-14; T. 369,
lines 13-17) .
4.

Defendant Yarnell had a completely unobstructed view of

traffic to his north just prior to the accident (T. 70, lines 1618; T. 74, lines 21-25; T. 114, lines 1-5; T. 121, lines 19-25; T.
122, lines 1-5; T. 143, lines 2-8; T. 177, lines 11-19).
5.

At trial, there was no evidence submitted of any kind to

prove that weather, road conditions, highway defects or design,
other traffic, obstructions, acts of God, animals or any other type
of intervening force contributed in any way to the causation of the
subject accident (T. 42-165, 170-232, 363-444).
6.

Both vehicles involved in the subject accident were newer

vehicles, and there was no evidence submitted at trial to prove
that any type of design or manufacturing defects of the vehicles or
any type of malfunctions of the vehicles contributed in any way to
the causation of the accident (T. 42-165, 170-232, 363-444; T. 41,
lines 18-25; T. 45, line 13; Defendant's Trial Exhibits # 2, 3, 4
and 5).

In fact, the only evidence submitted concerning the

functioning of the vehicles was testimony to the effect that the
vehicles were functioning properly at the time of the accident (T.
45, lines 12-15; T. 49, lines 7-10; T. 146, lines 2-12).
2

7•

There was no evidence submitted at trial to dispute that

both drivers involved in the accident had valid drivers licenses
(T. 135, lines 20-23; T. 136, lines 10-20).

Both drivers were

wearing their eye glasses at the time of the accident (T. 53, lines
1-5; T. 113, lines 16-18).

Defendant Warren Yarnell may have been

on medication at the time of the accident (T. 370, lines 10-16).
Also, Mr. Yarnell was 70 years old at the time of the accident, so
it should be inferred that he would have the natural slowing of
physical reactions that occurs with age (T. 112, lines 17-25; T.
113, lines 1-9; T. 129, lines 2-3; T. 195, lines 22-25; T. 196,
lines 1-22).
8.

Just prior to the accident, Plaintiff Tina Noonan had

missed her planned turn off, and she was unfamiliar with the area
(T. 42, lines 14-16; T. 54, lines 3-7, 15-17; T. 56, lines 15-21;
T. 63, lines 17-19; T. 145, lines 4-12).

Defendant Warren Yarnell

was on his way to the Smith & Edwards store near Brigham City to do
some shopping (T. 113, lines 19-23; T. 129, lines 6-7; T. 364, line
25) .
9.

It was Ms. Noonan's belief concerning the proper way to

make a U-turn, that a vehicle attempting to make a U-turn should
steer to the far left-hand-side of the lane, should signal well in
advance, should turn left onto the opposite shoulder of the roadway
(the shoulder to the left of the driver), should stop, and then
should complete the U-turn on such shoulder of the roadway before
pulling back into traffic traveling in the opposite direction (T.
44, line 25; T. 45, lines 1-2; T. 47, lines 10-16, 22-25; T. 48,
3

line 1; T. 59, lines 1-9; T. 60, lines 4-10; T. 65, lines 12-15; T.
66, lines 20-25; T. 67, line 1).
10.

It was Defendant Warren Yarnell's belief that the proper

way for a car to make a U-turn was to first pull completely off
onto the right hand shoulder of the roadway, to stop, to allow all
traffic to pass, and then to complete the U-turn in the middle of
the roadway, by turning sharply to the left across both lanes of
traffic, until the U-turn was completed and the car was traveling
in the opposite direction (T. 117, lines 16-25; T. 118, lines 1-5;
T. 120, lines 7-21; T. 135, lines 16-19).
11.
driver

Tina Noonan testified that she believed she saw the
and

passenger

of

the

Yarnell

vehicle

engaged

in

conversation, as she g ..impsed into her rearview mirror just prior
to the accident (T. 45, lines 22-24; T. 66, lines 4-8; T. 67, lines
2-4).

Mr. and Mrs. Yarnell testified that they were not engaged

in conversation just prior to the accident (T. 132, lines 20-25; T.
133, lines 1-2; T. 365, lines 21-22).
12.

Just prior to the accident, Plaintiff Tina Noonan was

focusing her full attention on her driving, and was concerned about
giving a clear indication to the Yarnell vehicle that she was going
to make a left hand or U-turn onto the lefthand shoulder of the
roadway, because she believed the driver of the Yarnell vehicle was
not paying close attention to his driving (T. 43, lines 5-11; T.
44, lines 8-12, 24-25; T. 45, lines 1-11, 16-20, 22-24; T. 46,
lines 19-25; T. 47, lines 1, 10-16; T. 48, lines 13-20; T. 50,
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lines 1-13; T. 60, lines 4-10; T. 66, lines 4-8, 20-25; T. 67,
lines 1-4; T. 145, lines 12-21).
13.

It was the testimony of both Tina Noonan and Donald

Kennedy that Ms. Noonan began signaling for a lefthand turn quite
some distance (perhaps as much as 1,000 feet) prior to beginning
her left hand/U-turn

(T. 44, lines 22-25; T. 45, lines 1-9, 16-18;

T. 46, lines 19-22; T. 65, lines 20-24; T. 73, lines 3-11, 23-25;
T. 74, lines 1, 21-25; T. 79, lines 18-21; T. 97, lines 14-23; T.
98, lines 1-20; T. 145, lines 12-25; T. 146, lines 1-10; T. 163,
lines 17-21; Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2).
14.

Warren Yarnell testified that he first noticed the Noonan

vehicle when he was at the top of the hill and when the Noonan
vehicle was at the bottom of the hill beginning to slow down (T.
49, lines 7-13; T. 120, lines 1-6; T. 124, lines 16-25; T. 125,
lines 1-4; T. 129, lines 12-13; T. 130, lines 20-25).

He

testified that he did not notice the actions of the Noonan vehicle
again until just prior to the crash, and that he did not notice
that the Noonan vehicle was signaling for a left hand turn, but
only noticed the brake lights of the Noonan vehicle (T. 114, lines
13-15; T. 115, lines 14-22; T. 116, lines 4-5, 17; T. 118, lines
24-25; T. 119, lines 1-5; T. 131, lines 1-21; T. 136, lines 21-25;
T. 137, lines 1-5).

Mrs. Yarnell, who was a passenger in the

Yarnell vehicle, testified that she initially noticed the Noonan
vehicle while the Yarnell vehicle was near the top of the hill and
the Noonan vehicle was near the bottom of the hill (T. 373, lines
21-23; T. 375, lines 2-5). She testified that she did not notice
5

the actions of the Noonan vehicle again until just prior to the
accident, and that she noticed one blink of the left hand turn
signal, and the brake lights, of the Noonan vehicle (T. 367, lines
4-8; T. 373, lines 21-23; T. 374, lines 4-5; 375, lines 14-15).
15.

When Mr. Yarnell noticed Tina Noonan's actions just prior

to the accident, he believed that she was in the process of making
a U-turn, and he anticipated that she would do this by first
pulling off to the right hand shoulder of the road and stopping to
let all traffic pass, before completing her U-turn (T. 118, lines
6-12, 24-25; T. 120, lines 7-21; T. 123, lines 14-25; T. 124. lines
1-2; T. 129, lines 12-14, 19-24; T. 137, lines 3-14).

Based on

this anticipation, he began to pass the Noonan vehicle on the left
hand side of the Noonan vehicle (T. 118, lines 13-15, 21-25; T.
123, lines 14-25; T. 124, lines 1-15; T. 125, lines 14-24; T. 129,
lines 12-15; T. 130, lines 7-19; T. 134, lines 13-24; T. 137, lines
3-14).

Mr. Yarnell testified that even if he had seen the Noonan

vehicle signaling for a left hand turn while he was a great
distance from the Noonan vehicle, he would not have taken any
different action, because he still would have believed that Tina
Noonan would first pull off to the right hand shoulder of the road
and stop, before completing her U-turn

(T. 123, lines 14-25; T.

124, lines 1-2) .
16.

Mr. and Mrs. Yarnell testified that after Mr. Yarnell

began to pass the Noonan vehicle on the left hand side of the
Noonan vehicle, the Noonan vehicle suddenly turned left directly in
front of the Yarnell vehicle, and Mr. Yarnell attempted to steer
6

even farther to the left to avoid a collision, but was unsuccessful
in avoiding a collision (T. 114, lines 10-12; T. 115, lines 10-13;
T. 118, lines 13-20; T. 123, lines 11-13; T. 133, lines 8-10; T.
146, lines 16-25; T. 147, line 1; T. 365, lines 1-20; T. 374, lines
20-25; T. 375, lines 1-23; Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 ) .

They further

testified that Mr. Yarnell did not attempt to slow the speed of his
vehicle after first seeing Mrs. Noonan's car, until he slammed on
his brakes when the collision appeared to be imminent

(T. 120,

lines 22-25; T. 121, lines 1-18; T. 127, lines 5-7; T. 147, lines
20-25; T. 148, lines 1-2; T. 374, lines 20-25; T. 375, lines 1-23).
17.

The point of impact of the collision was approximately

three feet eight inches to the left/west of the center line of the
roadway (T. 411, lines 12-25; T. 412, lines 1-8).
18.

It was the testimony of Mr. Yarnell's expert witness

that the physical evidence of the accident, the point of impact,
the angle of collision of the vehicles, and the final resting place
of the vehicles was consistent with the Yarnells' version of how
the accident occurred—namely, that the Noonan vehicle first pulled
off onto the right hand shoulder of the roadway, and then turned
sharply to the left directly in front of the Yarnell vehicle (T.
119, lines 6-25; T. 120, line 1; T. 122, lines 12-23; T. 126, lines
24-25; T. 127, lines 1-4, 20-25; T. 128, lines 11-19; T. 129, lines
16-18; T. 130, lines 6-19; T. 131, lines 1-25; T. 132, lines 1-9;
T. 140, lines 24-25; T. 141, lines 1-10; T. 144, lines 11-24; T.
146, lines 16-25; T. 147, lines 1-25; T. 148, lines 1-2; T. 151,
lines 2-25; T. 152, lines 1-4, 23-25; T. 153, lines 1-25; T. 154,
7

lines 1-7, 15; T. 156, lines 6-25; T. 163, lines 17-25; T. 164,
lines 1-7; T. 165, lines 4-21; T. 365, lines 1-25; T. 374, lines
20-25; T. 375, lines 1-23; T. 388, line 1 through T. 396, line 21;
T. 411, lines 18-25; T. 412, lines 1-8; T. 441, lines 1-25; T. 442,
lines 1-11; Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). It was the testimony of the
investigating officer, Sergeant Hartman, and the Plaintiff's expert
witness that the point of impact, the angle of collision, and the
final resting place of the vehicles was inconsistent with the
Yarnell's version of the how the accident occurred, but rather was
consistent with Tina Noonan's version of how the accident occurred
—namely, that she did not pull off onto the right shoulder of the
road, but rather began her left hand turn while she was within the
paved portion of the north bound lane of traffic (T. 47, lines 4-6;
T 48, lines 21-25; T. 49, lines 1-2; T. 65, lines 16-19; T. 122,
lines 12-23; T. 126, lines 24-25; T. 127, lines 1-4, 20-25; T. 128,
lines 11-19; T. 140, lines 24-25; T. 141, lines 1-10; T. 144, lines
11-24; T. 145, lines 4-23; T. 147, lines 1-25; T. 148, lines 1-2;
T. 151, lines 2-25; T. 152, lines 1-4, 23-25; T. 153, lines 1-25;
T. 154, lines 1-7, 15; T. 156, lines 6-25; T. 163, lines 17-25; T.
164, lines 1-7; T. 165, lines 4-21; T. 183, line 5 through T. 200,
line 11; T. 213, lines 24-25; T. 214, lines 1-23; T. 219 through T.
228; T. 229, line 1; T. 411, lines 12-25; T. 412, lines 1-8;
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2).
19.

The "sworn statement" or "deposition" of Mr. Kennedy was

scheduled by Defendant's attorney at Mr. Kennedy's residence, with
a court reporter present (T. 76, lines 8-16; T. 77, lines 5-7, 128

15).

The court reporter and a representative from Defendant's

insurance company arrived a little bit early, and visited with Mr.
Kennedy prior to the taking of the sworn statement/deposition (T.
8, lines 4-7; T. 10, lines 16-25; T. 11, lines 1-9, 24-25; T. 12,
lines 4-7; T. 77, lines 12-19).
20.

Prior

to

the

taking

of

Mr.

Kennedy's

sworn

statement/deposition, Mr. Kennedy asked Defendant's attorney if he
could review the accident report and his written statement made at
the time of the accident to refresh his memory, prior to testifying
(T. 76, lines 21-23; T. 80, lines 15-22; T. 101, lines 14-21).
Defendant's attorney agreed to allow Mr. Kennedy to review such
accident report and written statement, but failed to do so until
the

sworn

statement/deposition

was

approximately

three-fourths

completed, and even then, he was allowed to review this information
only for a short time before further questioning (T. 76, lines 2125; T. 78, lines 3-6; T. 79, line 25; T. 80, lines 1-8, 15-22; T.
81, lines 6-13, 18-24; T. 82, lines 17-23; T. 83, lines 2-25; T.
84, lines 1-8; T. 86, lines 10-23; T. 87, lines 22-25; T. 90, lines
14-16; T. 95, lines 9-10; T. 101, lines 14-21, 25; T. 102, lines 12; T. 104, lines 14-17, 25; T. 105, lines 1-24).

By the time Mr.

Kennedy was allowed to review the police report and his prior
written statement, he had already testified contrary to his prior
written statement, based on his unrefreshed memory of the accident
(T. 78, lines 7-23; T. 82, lines 17-25; T. 83, lines 1-12, 19-25;
T.84, lines 1-23; T. 94, lines 8-15; T. 95, lines 20-25; T. 96,
lines 1-13; T. 103, lines 12-21; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 ) .
9

After

having

a chance

to

review

the police

report

and

his

written

statement and to think about such information, his refreshed memory
was consistent with his statement made at the time of the accident
(T. 73, lines 9-25; T. 74, lines 1-25; T. 78, lines 24-25; T. 79,
line 1, 4-25; T. 80, lines 1-8; T. 98, lines 23-25; T. 99, lines 110; T. 102, lines 3-24; T. 104, lines 4-21; T. 108, lines 4-25; T.
109, lines 1-9; T. 144, lines 1-10; T. 148, lines 12-24; T. 163,
lines 17-25; T. 164, lines 1-7; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 ) .
21.

Although

statement/deposition

the
lasted

taking
more

of

Mr.

than

two

Kennedy's
hours,

the

sworn
sworn

statement/deposition transcript contains only twenty-five pages of
script (T. 86, lines 10-18; R. 520, 538-540 and "Deposition of
Donald J. Kennedy").

Mr. Kennedy testified at trial that during

the taking of such sworn statement/deposition Defendant's attorney
went on and off the record so many times that he did not know when
they were off the record and when they were on the record (T. 87,
lines 18-21).
22.

At

the

time

of

taking

Mr.

Kennedy's

sworn

statement/deposition, Defendant's attorney told Mr. Kennedy that he
could make corrections to the transcript when he received it for
review

(T. 76, lines 19-20; T. 88, lines

2-12, 15-23).

Upon

receiving the transcript for review, and after having a chance to
review the police report and his written statement, Mr. Kennedy was
distressed, because he felt that the testimony he had given at the
sworn statement/deposition, prior to the time when he was allowed
to refresh his memory by reading the police report and his written
10

statement, was almost completely contrary to what had actually
occurred at the time of the accident (T. 82, lines 17-25; T. 83,
lines 1-12, 19-25; T. 84, lines 4-23; T. 87, lines 14-17; T. 88,
lines 2-12; T. 103, lines 12-21; T. 107, lines 23-25; T. 108, lines
1-3; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 ) .
attorneys

that

he

had

the

He was informed by Tina Noonan's
right

to make

corrections

to

the

driver,

and

transcript, and he did so (T. 88, lines 2-12, 15-23).
23.

Because

Mr.

Kennedy

is

a

professional

because the subject accident occurred approximately four-and-onehalf

years

before

statement/deposition

the
by

taking

Defendant's

of

Mr.

Kennedy's

sworn

attorney, Mr. Kennedy

had

witnessed several other accidents following the subject accident
(T. 69, lines 10-16; T. 80, lines 9-12; T. 101, lines 22-24; T.
104, lines 22-24). Without first being able to refresh his memory
concerning the subject accident, in retrospect, Donald Kennedy
believed that he may have confused the subject accident with other
accidents, and therefore, testified inaccurately at the taking of
his sworn statement/deposition (T. 80, lines 9-12; T. 81, lines 613, 18-25; T. 82, lines 1-4, 15-25; T. 83, lines 1-12, 19-25; T.
84, lines 1-23; T. 91, lines 13-15; T. 94, lines 8-15; T. 104,
lines 22-24).

Mr. Kennedy made the changes to the transcript of

his sworn statement/deposition on his own, without any kind of
inappropriate coercion or persuasion from Plaintiff's attorneys (T.
85, lines 12-15; T. 86, lines 2-4; T. 87, lines 14-17; T. 88, lines
3-12; T. 91, lines 9-23; T. 95, lines 6-8; T. 104, lines 13-21; T.
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106, lines 1-25; T. 107, lines 1-22; T. 109, lines 24-25; T. 110,
lines 1-7).
24.

In its special verdict, the jury found that although Mr.

Yarnell was negligent, his negligence was not a proximate cause of
the subject accident (R.235, 346-347).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A marshalling of the evidence demonstrates that although the
jury could have concluded that Tina Noonan was contributorily
negligent and that her negligence was a concurrent proximate cause
of the accident, they could not have reasonably concluded that
Warren Yarnell's negligence was not at least a concurrent proximate
cause of the accident.
The court committed

reversible error by submitting Jury

Instruction No. 10 to the jury.

Such jury instruction clearly

misstated the applicable law and misled the jury, which prejudiced
Appellant's case.
It was error for the court to refuse to allow Sergeant Hartman
to testify as an expert witness, whereas such testimony was clearly
admissible.
The trial court erred in allowing admission of portions of the
sworn statement/deposition testimony of Donald Kennedy because: (1)
Defendant did not comply with U.R.C.P. Rule 30 in obtaining such
testimony, and

(2) the probative value of such testimony was

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Appellant has a good faith, extremely meritorious basis for
appealing the trial court judgment.
12

Accordingly, this appeal is

not frivolous.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A MORE THOROUGH MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE STILL
DEMONSTRATES THAT THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
In marshalling the evidence more thoroughly in Appellant's
Reply Brief, Appellant has attempted to address all evidence
concerning any possible cause that could have proximately resulted
in the subject accident.

Plaintiff has categorized the possible

causes of the accident into five separate categories:
1.

Physical conditions present at the accident site at
the time of the accident;

2.

Physical conditions of the vehicles at the time of the
accident;

3.

Physical/mental condition of the drivers at the time of
the accident;

4.

Actions of the drivers at the time of the accident;

5.

Physical evidence found at the accident site following
the accident.

After analyzing the evidence relating to these factors, it is
apparent that the jury's verdict, namely, that although Defendant

was negligent, his negligence did not proximately cause the subject
automobile accident, was manifestly against the weight of the
evidence.
A,

Physical conditions of accident site.
The evidence presented

at trial concerning

the physical

conditions present at the accident site at the time of the accident
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was that the weather was sunny and clear, with good lighting, and
no glare from the sun.
The road conditions were dry and clear. The road design was
such as to give Mr. Yarnell a clear, unobstructed view of the
accident site.

The intersection of 1900 West and 1200 North sits

on top of a hill, which then inclines downward to the north. This
should have given Mr. Yarnell a better view of northbound traffic
than he would have had on level ground. Mr. Yarnell testified that
he had an unobstructed view of traffic to the north prior to the
accident.
There was no evidence admitted at trial to prove that there
were any intervening forces, such as weather or road conditions,
other traffic, a pedestrian, an animal, or an act of God, that
contributed to the cause of the accident. All witnesses testified
that there was no southbound traffic prior to or at the time of the
subject accident.

Accordingly, the jury had no evidence on which

to base a conclusion that the accident was proximately caused by
any of the physical conditions present at the accident site at the
time of the accident.
B.

Physical condition of vehicles.
There was no evidence admitted

at trial to prove that there

were any manufacturing or design defects in either of the two
vehicles involved in the accident.
evidence

admitted

at

trial

to

Furthermore, there was no

prove

that

there

were

any

malfunctions of the vehicles, which contributed to the causation of
the accident.

Moreover, the only testimony at trial concerning
14

the condition of the vehicles was that both vehicles were rather
new vehicles, and that both vehicles were functioning properly at
the time of the accident.

Accordingly, this evidence fails to

support the jury's verdict.
C.

Physical/mental condition of the drivers.
The evidence showed that both drivers had valid drivers

licenses, and were wearing their eyeglasses at the time of the
accident.

The evidence showed that Mr. Yarnell may have been

taking medication at the time of the accident.

The evidence

further showed that Mr. Yarnell was 70 years old, creating the
inference that Mr. Yarnell's physical reactions were slowed to some
extent, because of the natural aging process.
The evidence showed that Mrs. Noonan was unfamiliar with the
area, and had missed her planned turn-off.

However, the evidence

also showed that Mrs. Noonan was paying careful attention to her
driving, because she was looking for a place to safely complete a
U-turn.

On the other hand, the evidence showed that Mr. Yarnell

was not paying close attention to his driving, whereas he first
noticed Mrs. Noonan's vehicle when she was slowing down at the
bottom of the hill, and did not notice the actions of Mrs. Noonan's
vehicle again, until he was only a few car lengths away from Mrs.
Noonan's vehicle as it began to make a left hand turn. Mr. Yarnell
did not see the blinking left turn signal of Tina Noonan's car.
Mrs. Noonan had an accurate understanding about the legally
correct way in which to make a U-turn.
inaccurate understanding

Mr. Yarnell had an

about how a U-turn
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should be made.

Moreover, Mr. Yarnell testified that just prior to the accident he
anticipated that Mrs. Noonan was about to execute a U-turn in the
manner in which Mr. Yarnell thought a U-turn should be executed
(namely, by pulling off onto the right hand shoulder of the road
and stopping to let traffic pass, before completing such U-turn in
the middle of the roadway).

This anticipation on the part of Mr.

Yarnell was what initially prompted Mr. Yarnell to begin to pass
the Noonan vehicle to the left of the Noonan vehicle. Mr. Yarnell
also testified that he would not have changed his course of action
even if he had observed Mrs. Noonan's left turn signal for a
significant distance.
Although the above described evidence supports to some extent
a conclusion on the part of a reasonable jury that Mrs. Noonan may
also have been negligent, and that her negligence may also have
been a proximate cause of the subject accident, it does not support
the jury's conclusion that Mr. Yarnell's negligence was not a
concurrent, additional proximate cause of the subject accident.
D.

Actions taken by drivers.
Based on the evidence stated above in the statement of

additional

facts, one

of

the

conclusions

a

reasonable

jury

unavoidably would have made was that Mr. Yarnell was not paying
close attention to his driving (T. 74, lines 8-11), and that he did
not react appropriately to the obvious hazard created by Tina
Noonan in signaling and slowing down for a lefthand turn.

He did

not notice that Mrs. Noonan was signaling to make a lefthand turn.
Instead, he erroneously anticipated that Mrs. Noonan's vehicle was
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going to pull off onto the righthand shoulder of the road and stop.
Therefore, he began to pass Mrs. Noonan's vehicle on the lefthand
side of Mrs. Noonan's vehicle, directly into the course of Mrs.
Noonan's apparent lefthand turn, without even slowing down his
vehicle as a precautionary measure.
Thus, even though a reasonable jury could have determined that
Tina Noonan may have been negligent in addition to Mr. Yarnell's
negligence, a reasonable jury could not have determined that Mr.
Yarnell's negligence did not constitute a concurrent, proximate
cause of the subject accident.
E.

Physical evidence following accident.
Following the subject accident, Officer Hartman's investiga-

tion showed that the point of impact occurred three feet eight
inches to the left of the center line of the roadway.

The

investigation also showed that there were no tire marks in the
gravel on the righthand side of the roadway.

Finally, his

investigation showed that there was damage to the right front
fender of the Yarnell vehicle, and to the left front fender of the
Noonan vehicle.

His investigation showed that the vehicles came

to rest in a field northwest of the point of impact, with both
vehicles facing in a northwesterly direction.
For purposes of this appeal, it must be concluded that the
jury believed the Defendant's expert witness in interpreting the
physical evidence.

However, the physical evidence and expert

witness testimony does nothing more than corroborate the Yarnells'
version of the accident, as has been explained above.
17

This

evidence does absolutely nothing to prove that Mr. Yarnell's
negligence, in failing to slow down his vehicle when he observed a
potential hazard ahead of him, in failing to observe the blinking
lefthand turn signal of the Noonan vehicle, and in passing the
Noonan vehicle on the lefthand side even though the Noonan vehicle
was signaling to make a left hand turn, was not a proximate cause
of the subject accident.

Rather, this evidence merely supports

the conclusion that Tina Noonan may have also been negligent, and
that her negligence may have also been a concurrent proximate cause
of the subject accident.
POINT II.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10 CLEARLY MISLED THE JURY IN THIS CASE,
BY INCORRECTLY STATING THE LAW RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES OF
NEGLIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Jury instruction No. 10 stated in relevant part:
"A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a speed so
slow as to impede or block the normal and reasonable
movement of traffic except when: (a) Reduced speed is
necessary for safe operation; (b) Upon a grade; or (c) In
compliance with official traffic control devises."
(R. 278.) As was explained in Appellant's Original Brief on pages
16 and 17, this jury instruction clearly and incorrectly implies
that even if a vehicle is in the process of making a proper lefthand turn, it cannot impede the flow of traffic traveling in the
same direction.

However, common sense as well as statutory law

recognizes that to execute a proper lefthand turn a car may be
required to slow down and perhaps even stop, impeding the traffic
behind it.

Accordingly, the law allows a vehicle making a proper

lefthand turn to impede traffic traveling in the same direction.
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See, U.C.A. §41-6-73 and U.C.A. §41-6-55(3).
Utah case law does not support Defendant's arguments that Jury
Instruction No. 10 was properly submitted to the jury; rather, it
supports the opposite proposition.

In the case of Nielsen v.

Pioneer Valley Hosp., 830 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
"[J]urors are sworn to follow the instructions as given
by the court and they are not bound by explanations from
counsel for the parties as to their meaning. More basic,
however, is the principle that parties are entitled to
clear instructions setting out their theories of the
case, and argument by counsel is not an adequate
substitute for that entitlement."
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that while lawyers and judges may
be able to interpret jury instructions that are not perfectly
clear, lay juries cannot be guaranteed to do so.

Ld. at 274.

Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that parties are entitled to
"a presentation of the case to the jury under instructions that

clearly, concisely and accurately state the issues in the laws
applicable thereto so that the jury will understand its duties."
Id. at 275.
Based upon this standard, it is clear that the court erred in
submitting Jury Instruction No. 10 to the jury.

Not only did the

plain language of the jury instruction misstate the applicable law,
but also, it would have been difficult for even a trained legal
mind to have guessed the court's intended interpretation of such
jury instruction.
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The submission of an improper jury instruction is reversible
error if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party.

Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah

App. 1991); See also, Steele v. Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah
App. 1987).
It was an undisputed fact in this case that Tina Noonan slowed
her vehicle to the point that it impeded the progress of Mr.
Yarnell's vehicle, in order to make her lefthand turn. If the jury
was under the false impression that to do so was negligence on the
part

of

Mrs.

Noonan,

it

is

probable

that

this

incorrect

interpretation of the law resulted in the jury's erroneous verdict.
Based on this jury instruction, it is foreseeable that a reasonable
jury could have concluded that Mrs. Noonan should bear absolute
responsibility for the accident, despite any apparent negligence on
the part of Mr. Yarnell.

Therefore, it is clear that the court's

action in submitting Jury Instruction No. 10 was prejudicial to
Plaintiff's case, and constituted reversible error.
POINT III,
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER TO GIVE EXPERT OPINION
TESTIMONY.
During trial, the court would not allow Sergeant Hartman to
give his expert opinion concerning (a) the cause of the subject
accident,

(b) the manner

in which

it occurred,

(c) whether

Yarnell's actions in passing Noonan were improper, or (d) whether
Yarnell could have done anything to avoid the accident (T. 149-150,
154-157) .
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It was clearly improper for the court to refuse to allow
Sergeant Hartman to give his expert opinion concerning why he
believed Mr. Yarnell's actions in passing Tina Noonan's vehicle
were improper and concerning whether Mr. Yarnell could have taken
any actions to avoid the collision (T. 155, lines 2-25; T. 156,
lines 1-2; T. 157. lines 1-5).

Because of his experience and

training (T. 138-139), it was clear that Sergeant Hartman was
qualified to testify concerning these issues.

Neither of these

opinions would have constituted a legal conclusion, but instead,
would have constituted allowable expert opinion testimony on which
the jury could have based their own legal conclusions related to
the issues of negligence and proximate cause.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING ADMISSION OF PORTIONS
OF THE SWORN STATEMENT/DEPOSITION OF DONALD J. KENNEDY AT
TRIAL.
Defendant argues that the testimony he obtained from Donald
Kennedy was a "sworn statement," and not a "deposition," and
therefore, U.R.C.P. Rule 30 did not apply. However, the process in
which

Donald

deposition

Kennedy's

in every

testimony

aspect, except

was

obtained

that

resembles

Defendant

a

purposely

neglected to give Plaintiff notice of such proceeding (R. 496-497).
Donald Kennedy was placed under oath, and was told that such
testimony could be used against him at trial. Defendant's attorney
interrogated Mr. Kennedy in an aggressive manner in an attempt to
get Mr. Kennedy to testify favorably to her client's position in
the case (T. 98, lines 23-25; T. 99, lines 1-25; T. 100, lines 121

10).

Defendant's counsel went on and off the record many times

during the questioning session.

Defendant's attorney told Mr.

Kennedy that he would have a chance to review and correct the
transcript

of his testimony.

Such testimony was thereafter

transcribed, and was entitled "Deposition of Donald J. Kennedy."
Regardless of whether Defendant's attorney wishes to refer to
such proceeding as the taking of a "sworn statement," rather than
as a "deposition," the end product is identical.

Furthermore, if

the court allows Defendant in this case to ignore the notice
requirement of U.R.C.P. Rule 30 simply by referring to a deposition
as a "sworn statement," the court will have created a precedent
that allows a party to gain an unfair advantage in any case, without any recourse to the other parties, simply by being the first
one to contact potential, non-party, fact witnesses. Such a ruling
would have a drastic, harmful impact on the fairness and equity of
all civil litigation in Utah.

On the other hand, because of

Defendant's failure to comply with the notice requirements of
U.R.C.P.

Rule

30,

it

would

not

be

harsh,

inequitable

or

unreasonable to "penalize" the Defendant in this case by refusing
to

allow

Defendant

to

use

his

ill-gotten

"sworn

statement"/"deposition" testimony at trial, to gain an unfair
advantage over the Plaintiff.
Furthermore,

the

statement/deposition

trial

court's

admission

of

the

sworn

testimony of Donald Kennedy, even for a

limited purpose, was reversible error, because of the obvious lack
of reliability of such testimony.
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Mr. Kennedy asked for an

opportunity to review the accident report and his written statement
given at the accident scene, prior to being questioned.

However,

Defendant's attorney allowed him to review such accident report and
written statement only after most of his testimony had already been
taken.

Then, he was given only a short time to read and review

such statement, before being asked further questions.
In addition, although the taking of Mr. Kennedy's sworn
statement/deposition required more than two hours, the written
transcript constitutes only 25 pages.

Mr. Kennedy testified at

trial that Defendant's attorney went on and off the record so many
times that he was not sure of when he was on the record and when he
was off the record.

These two facts indicate that Defendant's

attorney may have recorded, out-of-context, only those responses of
Mr. Kennedy that were favorable to her client's case.

Finally,

Defendant's counsel was aggressive in attempting to persuade Mr.
Kennedy to testify favorably to her client's case, and Plaintiff's
counsel had no opportunity to make objections or to cross-examine
Mr. Kennedy to remedy any irregularities or errors in procedure
that occurred during such oral examination.
Even

though

the

statement"/"deposition"

court
was

determined
admissible

that
under

such

"sworn

U.R.E.

Rule

801(d)(1)(A) (despite Defendant's failure to comply with U.R.C.P.
Rule 30), such evidence should still have been excluded under
U.R.E. Rule 403, because the danger of unfair prejudice created by
such evidence substantially outweighed its probative value.

The

Utah Court of Appeals has held that even when a trial court has
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concluded that evidence is admissible under another rule, the
court's inquiry is not complete, until the court concludes that the
evidence meets the requirements of U.R.E. Rule 403. See, State v.
Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 571 (Utah App. 1991).

Evidence is unfairly

prejudicial if it has a tendency to influence the trial by improper
means.

Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 69

(Utah App. 1992) .
In this case, because such "sworn statement"/"deposition" was
taken under oath, it was especially prejudicial.

Defendant's

attorney implied to the jury that such prior inconsistent statements were actually more credible than Mr. Kennedy's written statement given at the accident site and his trial testimony (T.84,
lines 24-25; T. 85, lines 1-11; T. 87, lines 12-17; T. 90, lines
12-25; T. 91, lines 16-18; T. 100, lines 15-17).

Because of the

jury's lack of sophistication, they were unable to recognize that
Mr. Kennedy's sworn statement/deposition testimony was totally
unreliable.
On the other hand, the overwhelming weight of the credible
evidence showed that the statement made by Mr. Kennedy at the time
of the accident and his trial testimony constituted the most
accurate, credible account of the events leading up to the accident
(T. 151, lines 11-25; T. 152, line 1).
As has been explained above, by allowing Defendant's use of
the "sworn statement"/"deposition"

testimony of Mr. Kennedy, the

trial court clearly allowed Defendant to influence the trial by
improper means. This is the very type of unfair prejudice that is
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sought to be prevented by proper application of U.R.E. Rule 403.
Accordingly, it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to
conduct a weighing test pursuant to U.R.E. Rule 403, and to prevent
admission of the "sworn statement"/"deposition" testimony of Donald
Kennedy for even a limited purpose, because its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighed its probative value.
POINT V,
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS.
Plaintiff has made a several extremely meritorious, good faith
arguments for reversal of the trial court's judgment in this case.
Because of the merit of Plaintiff's arguments, Plaintiff

fully

expects that the Court of Appeals will agree with the Plaintiff,
and

will

remand

this

case

for

a

new

trial.

Accordingly,

Defendant's claim that Plaintiff's appeal is frivolous is totally
unsubstantiated, and is barely worthy of a response.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,

Plaintiff respectfully requests the

court to reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
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